We are all aware of the recent unsuccessful attempt of
Faisal Shahzad to car bomb Times Square in New York City during May of
2010. Interesting and exciting as was
the news story, what attracted my attention was a report, briefly touched on by
the media, based on statements from the ensuing FBI and police investigation of
the bomber’s alleged financial sources.
The confusing and apparent contra- dictions of the news story led to
further research and this essay.
If the reader of the news reports had accepted the
funding story without careful reading, he would believe that co-conspiritors
had been taken into custudy in Boston, Pakistan and at least one other U.S.
location. All were identified as being
part of the organization which financed Shahzad’s failed bombing attempt, but
the FBI added one caveat: While the
identified group provided the financing, it was not clear that they were aware
of what they were financing. At first
reading it appeared that the agents were more interested in helping the
conspiritors with their defense than supporting the prosocuter’s case. Something wasn’t right. As it turned out, the agents were correct,
but not to defend the terror- ists.
The answer to the apparent contradictions is in an aged
financial system dating to medieval times called hawala, a form of financial
agency accepted under Islamic law in the field of contracts and general
obligations. In Wikipedia, hawala is
described in today’s world as used mostly by migrant workers, primarily in
South Asia, to return remittances to their countries of origin. Wikipedia goes on to describe how hawala
works:
“In the most basic variant of
the hawala system, money is transferred via a network of hawala brokers, or hawaladars.
A customer approaches a hawala broker in one city and gives a sum of
money to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The hawala broker calls another hawala broker
in the recipient’s city, gives disposition instructions of the funds (usually
minus a small commission), and promises to settle the debt at a later date.
“The unique feature of the
system is that no promissory instruments are exchanged between the hawala
brokers; the transaction takes place entirely on the honor system. As the system does not depend on the legal
enforceability of claims, it can operate even in the absence of a legal and
juridical environment. Informal records
are produced of individual transactions, and a running tally of the amount owed
by one broker to another is kept. Settlements
of debts between hawala brokers can take a variety of forms, and need not take
the form of direct cash transactions.
“In addition to commissions,
hawala brokers often earn their profits through bypassing official exchange
rates. Generally, the funds enter the
system in the source country’s currency and leave the system in the recipient
country’s currency. As settlements often
take place without foreign exchange transactions, they can be made at other
than official exchange rates.
“Hawala is attractive to
customers because it provides a fast and convenient transfer of funds, usually
with a far lower commission than that charged by banks. Its advantages are most pronounced when the
receiving country applies distortive exchange rate regulations (as has been the
case for many typical receiving countries such as Pakistan or Egypt) or when
the banking system in the receiving country is less complex (e.g. due to
differences in legal environ-
ment in places such as
Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia). Moreover,
in some parts of the world it is the only option for legitimate funds
transfers, and has even been used by aid organizations in areas where it is the
best functioning institution.
“Furthermore, the transfers are
informal and not effectively regulated by governments, which are a major
advantage to customers with tax, currency control, immigration, or other
concerns. In some countries, hawalas are
actually regulated by local governments and hawaladars are licensed to perform
their money brokering services.”
A normal and reasonable hawaladas commission is five
percent, but may vary based on local circum- stances, special requirements of
the transfer or additional fees due to regulation. There is no interest.
There have been cases in the United States where
particular money transfers under hawala were treated by the government as
financial laundering and the brokers were prosecuted.
In the current case, Shahzad received funds which he used
for the failed Times Square bombing attempt.
The lack of a paper trail has complicated the issue and
created more than one scenario, thus the FBI statement that the financing group
may not have been aware of the planned use of the funds.
If the source of the funds was the Taliban, al Quida or
any other terrorist organization and the flow of the funding from the
terrorists to Shahzad can be legally established, the financial group now in
custody will undoubtedly be brought to trial as co-conspirators. However, if the lawyers for the financial
group can successfully show that the receiving broker had no knowledge of the
source or planned use of the funds, then the prosocuter’s case will be
jeopardized and probably fail. The lack
of a paper trail makes for a difficult prosecution.
However, it would appear that the exposure from the
Shahzad prosecution could lead to Congress passing legislation regulating money
transfers under hawala and possibly requiring the licensing of the hawaladars.
May 2010
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